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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD S. BENNETT, WALLACE
F. BENNETT, and HAROLD H.
BENNETT, Trustees, dba THE BENNETT ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.
Case No.
ARNEY K. DOWNARD,
Defendant and Respondent, ( 13740
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CLARIS E. JOHNSON and VELMA
JOHNSON and BOYD J. CLARK
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BRIEF OF
PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS BENNETT

NATURE OF CASE
Appellants' statement of the "Nature of the Case"
is incorrect in one critical point: Defendant Downard's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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crossclaim against the co-defendant8-appellants Johnsons and Clarks was and is based upon his construction
contract with the Johnsons and the Clarks, as Owners,
and not on any contract with Taco Siesta International.
(See Amended Cross-Claim, Paragraph 1, R. 62; Construction Contract, Defendants' Exhibit 1.)
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
Appellants' Brief correctly states the disposition of
the case by the Lower Court,
RELIEF SOUGHT BY
RESPONDENTS BENNETT ON APPEAL
Respondents Bennett seek the affirmance of the
judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As it appears that the appellants' Statement of
Facts is incorrect in some particulars, and omits the
statement of other facts esablished which are deemed
of crucial importance to an understanding of the issues
of the case and the rendering of a judgment in accordance with facts and the law, respondents are under the
unfortunate necessity of controverting appellants' statement in some particulars and restating the facts as we
believe the record requires, trying to present the same
as simply and intelligibly as possible.
Defendants-Appellants, the Johnsons and Clarks,
owned unimproved land in South Ogden. In the pro-
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motion of the enterprise involving the land, as hereinafter set out, they were all acting together as partners
(R. 214-215.) On April 12, 1968, the Johnsons and the
Clarks, in the promotion of this enterprise, and with the
apparent purpose of improving the land and making it
productive, entered into an "AGREEMENT" with Taco
Siesta, Inc., a corporation. (Defendants' Exhibit 2.)
This Agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2, contains two
separate and distinct (even if related) agreements: First,
the parties thereto, as a joint enterprise, and by their
joint efforts and financing, undertake to construct a
permanent building on the land, and second, effective as
of the contemplated completion date of the building, the
land with the improvements to be constructed is leased
to Taco Siesta for a term of years at a stipulated rental.
As the terms of this Agreement are of critical importance,
we reproduce for the convenience of the court the following material portions of this Agreement in which the
Johnsons and Clarks are referred to as Lessors and Taco
Siesta is called the Lessee:
It is mutually understood and agreed by
these respective parties that in order for the
Lessee to enjoy the use of said property under
the terms and provisions of this agreement that
it is necessary to proceed with the construction
of a building on said property and with relation
to such construction project these respective parties do understand and mutually agree as follows:
That the Lessor herein will immediately
upon the execution of this agreement make avail-
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able the sum of $30,000.00 to be used, as hereinafter provided, for the construction of the
building in accordance with the plans and specifioations to be approved by the Lessor, and that
all such funds will be placed with First Security
State Bank of Salt Lake City under the direct
supervision of a proper officer of said firm and
to be disbursed by such officer in accordance
with the terms and provisions of the construction agreement in connection with such project.
Any unused funds to remain to credit of Lessor.
That the Lessee will immediately upon the
execution of this agreement provide, at the sole
expense of the Lessee, the necessary plans and
specifications in connection with such construction project, all of which will be subject to the
final approval of the Lessor. Lessee will engage
in a contract with a suitable contractor, duly
bonded, for the construction of such project in
accordance with the plans and specifications,
with the right in the Lessee at all times and at
the expense of the Lessee to inspect such construction project during the process of construction, and with the further right in the Lessee to
approve the particular contractor selected to
construct such project and in the determination
of the contract; price of construction.
That the Lessee will be solely responsible
for the payment of any and all sums necessary
to complete said building and improvement project, mutually decided upon, over and above the
said $30,000.00 to be provided by the Lessor
herein, and in the event any such excess funds
are necessary that they will be provided promptly by the Lessee in order that such project of
construction will not be delayed in any manner.
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The next paragraph of the Agreement originally provided that the Lessor would provide a concrete retaining
wall on the property, but this was amended by the parties by interlineation to provide that in lieu of the wall
the Lessor would provide an additional $2,000.00 in
money.
While the Agreement provided that the terms of the
leasehold would begin 5 days after notice of completion
of the building, it contained an additional provision that
in any event the term would start not longer than
90 days from the date of notice by the Lessor that the
construction funds were available. Rental was payable
from the beginning of the term at the rate of $650 per
month.
The Johnsons and Clarks borrowed the $32,000.00
which was to be their contribution to the cost of building
construction from First Security State Bank in Salt Lake.
(R. 250-251.) The proceeds of this loan were set up by
the bank in a special account for the benefit of the Johnsons and the Clarks but under the control of a hank
officer, as apparently contemplated by their construction Agreement with Taco Siesta. (Defendants' Exhibit
4, R. 251-256.)
Building plans were prepared and approved, and
anarcbitect, Joe Lewis Wilkins, retained to supervise
construction. The record seems to be silent or unclear
as to just who retained Mr. Wilkins.
Under date of August 25, 1968, a "Standard Form
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of Agreement Between Owner and Contractor" was executed. It recites that it is between "Claris E. Johnson
. . . the owner, and Arnel K. Downard Construction Co.,
the contractor." In the space provided for the "owner"
it is signed "Joe Lewis Wilkins, TACO SIESTA for
Clair Johnson." The contract appears to be a printed
form of document provided by the American Institute
of Architects, and contains minimal provisions. It is
noteworthy that nowhere in the contract is there any
provision whatsoever which requires the contractor
Downard to pay laborers and materialmen furnishing
labor or materials for the building construction. The
agreed contract price is $31,860.00, exclusive of landscaping, blacktop and fill.
On the same day, pursuant to demand made upon
him by the Johnsons and Clarks, the contractor Downard
procured from United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company an Indemnity Bond in the amount of $31,860.00
running to the appellant Claris E. Johnson as Obligee.
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, Johnsons' testimony, R. 257, 266
and 267.)
Because the additions of this Bond are also of critical importance, we set out as follows the essential conditions of the Bond.
NOW, THEREFORE, THE CONDITION
OF THIS OBLIGATION IS SUCH, That if
the said Principal shall well and truly perform
and fulfill all and every covenants, conditions,
stipulations and agreements in said contract
mentioned to be performed and fulfilled, and
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shall keep the said Obligee harmless and indemnified from and against all and every claim, demand, judgment, lien, cost and fee of eveory description incurred in suits or otherwise against
the said Obligee, growing out of or incurred in
the prosecution of said work according to the
terms of said contract, and shall repay to the
said Obligee all sums of money which the said
Obligee may pay to other persons on account
of work and labor done or materials furnished
on or for said contract, and if the said Principal
shall pay to the said Obligee all damages or forfeitures which may be sustained by reason of the
non-performance or mal-perfbrmance on the part
of the said Principal of any of the covenants,
conditions, stipulations and agreements of said
contract, then this obligation shall be void;
otherwise the same shall remain in full force
and virtue.
The Surety shall not be liable under this
bond to the Obligees, or either of them, unless
said Obligees, or either of them, shall make payments to the Principal strictly in accordance
with the terms of said contract as to payment
and shall perform all the other obligations to
be performed under said contract at the time
and in the manner therein set forth.
It is to be noted that the Bond runs only to the
Owner as Obligee, and does not run "to all other persons
as their interest may appear," (Laborers and materialmen) as required by Section 14-2-1, U. C. A., 1953.
This Bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, according to John-
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son, was supplied to him shortly after "we started the
job." (R. 257, Lines 3 to 10.)
It must also be noted that the Bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, not only runs to Claris E. Johnson as Obligee,
but recites that the Principal (Downard) "has executed
and entered into a certain contract with said Obligee
dated 8/25/68 CONSTRUCTION TACO SIESTA FACILITY AT 3715 SOUTH WASHINGTON, SOUTH
OGDEN, UTAH, in. said contract described . . ." From
the time he had received that Bond sometime in August
of 1968, or very shortly thereafter, when work on the
contract was just beginning, appellant Johnson had information sufficient to put him on inquiry as to his being
the Owner named in the construction contract referred

to.
With this knowledge Johnson proceeded to act as
the Owner and dealt directly with the contractor Downard throughout the construction procedures. Periodically
during the construction work as Mr. Downard got underway with the building abstraction under his contract
with Mr. Johnson, and as each progress payment became due, Mr. Downard would present Mr. Johnson
with a statement of monies owing sub-contractors, materialmen, et cetera, and then Johnson and Downard
would go to the bank and exhibit the bills submitted by
Downard, and the bank would give to Johnson its check
in an amount sufficient to pay the bills and progress
payment. Mr. Johnson would endorse the bank check
and deposit it in a special account which he and his
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partners had caused to be set up in his name as managing partner so that he could make the payments for
sums due Downard. Then Johnson would make checks
to Downard and to sub-contractors and Downard for the
amounts due and owing and deliver those personal checks
on the special account to Downard. However, on some
occasions the bank's check was endorsed directly to
Downard or to sub-contractor and delivered to him rather
than clearing through Johnson's special peirsonal account. (R. 254, Line 12 to 256, Line 19; Defendants'
Exhibit 4.) Johnson never gave a check or cash to Taco
Siesta out of the account. (R. 256, Line 30 to 257, Line
2.) Taco Siesta never paid Downard any money on the
contract. When he started the job he had nothing to
do with anyone except with the Own&r. Johnson personally asked Downard to furnish the Bond, plaintiffs'
Exhibit B and Johnson never told Downard to get any
of his money from Taco Siesta. (R. 277 to 280.)
Although the Agreement of April 12, 1968, (Defendants' Exhibit 2) required the Johnsons and Clarks to
posit $32,000.00 for the construction costs of the building
to be built in cooperation with Taco Siesta, and the contract with Downard provided that the Owners would
pay Downard $31,860.00 exdusve of landscaping, blacktop and fill, and Johnson undertook, to make the payments direct to Downard or to Downard and the subcontractors, Johnson, in breach of both contracts, deducted various amounts, and, by his own sworn testimony, paid Downard or his sub-contractors only a total
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of $29,179.81 (R, 253-254), leaving Downard without
funds to pay materialmen like the plaintiffs. This was
in breach of the condition of the Contractor's Bond providing that surety should not be liable to the Obligees
(Johnsons) unless the Obligees "shall make payments
to the Principal (Downard) strictly in accordance with
the terms of said contract as to payment . . ." And this,
of course, was done after he had received the Bond from
Downard and had notice of its contents and of the fact
therein contained that Downard's contract specified
Johnson as the Owner obligated thereunder.
It is undisputed that plaintiffs Bennett furnished
materials and labor used in the construction of the building of the reasonable value claimed, upon which Johnson
made on part payment by his personal check (Defendants' Exhibit 3) dated May 17, 1969, leaving a balance
owing Bennetts in the amount for which judgment was
rendered.
When the unpaid balance was not fortcoming, Mr.
Winters, Credit Manager for Bennetts, telephoned Mr.
Claris Johnson at a Salt Lake number (Johnson's place
of employment) furnished by Downard and received assurances from Mr. Johnson that tilings were going to
work out. It would just take time. There were several
conversations over a period of time but no collection
was effected and finally Mr. Johnson indicated that there
was a Bond that would provide protection. Winters
asked for a copy of the Bond and Johnson replied he
didn't have the Bond and would have to get the informa-
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tion. Winters asked for a copy of the Bond and Johnson
indicated that Winters could have a copy but failed to
produce it. He did, however, furnish him over the telephone the number of the Bond and advised that it had
been written by a man named Squires at the Eastman
Hatch Company. Mr. Winters called Squires, who told
him that the Bond was not a standard performance or
payment Bond as known in the construction industry
and that the Bond accrued not to the protection of
materialmen and suppliers but accrued to the protection of Mr. Johnson from the failure of Mr. Downard,
and if there was a loss resulting the claim against the
Bond would have to be filed by Mr. Johnson. He called
Mr. Johnson again and again asked for a copy of the
Bond and was told that Bennetts could have a copy of
it, but the Bond copy never came, although Johnson admitted he had the Bond in his files in Ogden. (R. 233
to 236.) Mr. Winters checked with the Recorder's Office
and found that Johnsons and Clarks were owners of
record, and assumed that they were the contracting owners in the light of the facts disclosed to him. (R. 241
and R. 239.)
Mr. Johnson testified he recalled Mr. Winters calling
him in Salt Lake several times about the matter. He
recalls telling Mr. Winters that he had the Bond in
Ogden and that perhaps the easiest way to get a copy
was to contact Eastman Hatch Company, who handled
the transaction. While Mr. Johnson testified that he
did not "refuse" to show Mr. Winters the Bond, there

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12

is absolutely no contention made that he ever did furnish a copy or exhibit the Bond to Mr. Winters. (R. 289
to 292.) Johnson admitted he could be mistaken about
his recoEection that he wasn't requested to take the
Bond out of his file and bring it to Salt Lake to show
it to Mr. Winters. (R. 294.)
The jury brought in a special verdict, quoted by
appellants in their statement of facts, to the effect that
the defendants Johnson and Clark had failed to exhibit
the Bond to the representative of the Bennetts upon
request made, and judgment for the plaintiff followed
pursuant to the statute. At the beginning of the trial
the Bennetts moved for judgment against defendants
Johnson and Clark upon the ground that it appeared,
without controversy, that they were the owners of the
property improved, that they contracted with Taco Siesta for the making of the improvements and ratified and
adopted the construction contract with Downard as their
contract, and that the Bond was insufficient as a matter
of law in that it does not meet the statutory requirements. The motion was denied. (R. 213-214.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE AGREEMENT OF THE JOHNSONS
AND CLARKS WITH TACO SIESTA (DEFENDANTS' EXHIBIT 2) AND THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT (DEFENDANTS'
EXHIBIT 1) THEREIN PROVIDED FOR
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ARE IN EFFECT ONE CONTRACT FOR
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THEIR LAND,
AND INTEREST THEREIN, BRINGING
THEM WITHIN THE BOND REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 14-2-1 AND 14-2-2,
U. C. A.
Because the AGREEMENT (Defendants' Exhibit
2) specifically refers to and requires that a contract be
entered into for the construction of a restaurant facility
upon the lands owned by the Johnsons and Clarks, it
must be construed together with the construction contract (Defendants' Exhibit 1) executed for them by the
architect on the job and by them ratified and adopted by
their subsequent acceptance of the benefits and recognition of their obligations to make payments thereunder,
and their control of such payments, after notice that the
contract had been executed in Johnson's name. DeLuxe
Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Ut. 144, 208 P. 2no 1127,
Headnote 2, (relied on by appellants) and cases therein
cited.
It is noteworthy that said AGREEMENT recites
the understanding and agreement of the parties thereto
that "in order for the Lessee to enjoy the use of said
property . . . it is necessary to proceed with the construction of a building on said property . . ." Further, by that
Agreement the plans are subject to the approval by the
Lessor, and the construction contractor must be duly
bonded. It is also particularly noteworthy that the parties to this Agreement thought it necessary to specific-
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ally provide that the Lessee (Taco Siesta) should have
"the right . . . to inspect such construction project during the process of construotion, and with the further
right in the Lessee to approve the particular contractors
selected to construct such project . . ." (Emphasis Supplied.) And it also must be remembered that the contract
provided that the Johnsons and Clarks would pay the
full contemplated costs of construction through their
own disbursing agent.
It is also obvious, and noteworthy, that the restaurant building contemplated was one of a permanent nature, which would not only make the leasehold useful
to the Lessee, but would be a permanent improvement
upon the reversionary ownership of the Johnsons and
the Clarks. Under the recitals in the Agreement, it is
also obvious and apparent that the building was necessary in order to secure to the Johnsons and the Clarks
the reserved rentals provided for, which in themselves
constitute an interest in land. And it is undisputed that
the Johnsons and the Clarks were the owners of the fee
in the land to be improved by the construction of the
building. Certainly this constitutes an "interest in land"
within the meaning of the statute!
The provisions of Utah Statutes "are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice." Section 68-3-2, U. C. A.
Furthermore this court has ruled that the Bond Statutes
in question must be interpreted and applied in such
manner as to carry out the purpose for which they were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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created: To protect those who supply labor and materials^ and that they are akin to the Mechanics lien Statutes in that they are designed to prevent a landowner
from taking the benefit of improvements placed on his
property without paying for labor and materials that
went into it. Metals Manufacturing Company v. Bank
of Commerce, 16 Ut. 2nd 74, 395 Pac. 2nd 914; King
Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Ut. 2nd
339, 374 Pac. 2nd 254, 21 Ut. 2nd 43, 440 Pac. 2nd 17.
Giving the statutes in question the required liberal
construction to effect the protection of the materialmen,
Bennetts, and to avoid the unjust enrichment of the
owners of the property improved, it seems too clear for
argument that the Johnsons and Clarks, as the owners
of the fee, and of the reserved rentals under the lease
intended to take effect on completion of the building,
were the owners of "any interest" in the land which was
improved in part by Bennett's contribution, within the
meaning of the statute.
It is respectfully submitted that it is also abundantly
clear that the AGREEMENT between the Johnsons and
the Clarks and Taco Siesta providing for the construction
of improvements on the lands of the former before the
effective date of the lease to the latter^ considered in
connection with the construction contract in the name
of Claris Johnson, the managing partner of the JohnsonClark partnership, adopted and ratified by Johnson's
acts, and the bond itself, demanded and received by
Johnson and naming him as the owner with whom Down-
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ard had contracted to construct the building, construed
as part of the same transaction, constitute together a
contract for the improvement of the lands of the Johnsons and the Clarks as owners within the meaning of
the Bonding Statute.
In this connection it should be noted that there is
not one scintilla of evidence to show that Bennetts had
any knowledge or notice of the provisions of the Agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2 stating that the Lessee
(Taco Siesta) will engage in a contract with a suitable
contractor for the construction of the project. Nor is
there one scintilla of evidence that Taco Siesta itself
ever did enter into any such contract with the contractor
Downard. And, in this connection, it is the established
law of Utah that suppliers of material for the improvement of realty are not bound by the unknown provisions
of private contracts between the landlord and a tenant
with respect to the installation of improvements on the
real property, as it would be unfair to bind such suppliers to the terms of agreements to which they were
not parties and of whose content they had no knowledge.
See Metals Manufacturing Company, supra, quoted in
King Brothers, Inc. v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 21 Ut.
2nd 43, 440 Ptetc. 2nd 17, 18.
It is further respectfully submitted that the arrangement between the Johnsons and the Clarks and Taco
Siesta was in effect a joint business enterprise and one
in which Taco Siesta was in effect the agent of the Johnsons and the Clarks in making inquiries as to Downard's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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availability and probable price as a construction contractor. As to the joint venture, see
Parker v. Trefry (CaL), 136 Pac. 2nd 55;
Garrett v. Kimbrel (Colo.). 376 Pac. 2nd 376;
and
In Re Schmidt (7th Circuit), 320 Fed. 2and 213.
And, in Mid-West Engineering Construction Compony v. Campagna (Mo.), 397 S. W. 2nd 616, it was
held that whenever a lease contains a covenant requiring the Lessee to make improvements of substantial and
permanent nature, the Lessee is the agent of the Lessor
for the purposes of subjecting the Lessor's reversion to
mechanics liens incident to the making of such improvements. It must be remembered that this honorable court
has, as indicated, held that our Bonding Statutes here
involved are exactly analogous to our mechanics lien laws.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the contractual arrangements for the improvement of the lands
belonging to the Johnsons and the Clarks amounted to
contracts for the improvement of their lands requiring
them to provide a good and sufficient Bond as required
by Section 14-2-1, U. C. A. King Brothers, Inc., supra,
cited and relied on by appellants, does not support appellants' position, but rather the position of the Bennetts.
It resulted in a mandate of this Honorable Court to
enter Judgment in favor of the plaintiff materialmen
against the defendant sued as an owner of an interest
in the land in question.
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POINT II.
THE JUDGMENT FOR P L A I N T I F F S
SHOUL BE AFFIRMED IN ANY EVENT
BECAUSE THE BOND F U R N I S H E D
(PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B) FAILS TO
MEET THE MANDATORY R E Q U I R E MENTS OF SECTION 14-2-1, U. C. A., AND
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
BECAUSE OF THE LEGAL INSUFFICIENCY OF SAID BOND.
The conditions of the Bond obtained by Claris E.
Johnson for his partnership are (1) that the contractor
shall perform the covenants and agreements of the construction contract, (2) the contractor shall indemnify
the owner Johnson from all claims, demands, costs et
cetera, against the Obligee Johnson growing out of the
contract work, (3) the contractor shall repay Johnson
all monies paid to other persons on account of labor
done or materials furnished for the contract, and (4)
the contractor shall pay the Obligee Johnson all damages
sustained by reason of the non-performance or mal-performance of the contractr of covenants and conditions of
the construction contract. If the contractor Downard
performs those obligations, then the Bond is void, otherwise in full force. It contains no provisions, as required
by the statute, for the prompt payment for material
furnished and labor performed under the contract. It
does not purport to run to "other persons as their inter-
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ests may appear," as required by the statute. It does
refer to the construction contract between Johnson and
Downard, but that "short fonn" contract, Defendants'
Exhibit 1 contains no provisions whatsoever by which
Downard specifically covenants and agrees to pay for all
material furnished and labor performed in the construction work. In this it differs very materially from the
construction contract involved in the principal case relied
on by appellants Johnson and Clark, as we shall make
clear.
Thus, in the case before the court, even though the
requirements of the contract are to be read into the Bond,
there is no provision providing for the payment of labors
and materialmen. It is purely a Bond to indemnify
Johnson against loss or claims: In effect it is an insurance policy for Johnson insuring him, and him alone,
against loss or damage arising out of Downard's activities in the performance of the consitruction contract. It
will be recalled that Bennett's Credit Manager, Mr.
Winters, at the suggestion of Mr. Johnson called Mr.
Squires at the Eastman Hatch Company, which was the
agency for the bonding company and inquired about the
Bond, and Squires^ in giving his own initerpi^tation of
the Bond he had written, told Mr. Winters that the Bond
was not a standard performance or payment bond where
materialmen could make claims against the Bonds and
that the Bond accrued not to the protection of materialmen but to the protection of Mr. Johnson only, who had
the sole right to file a claim thereon. (R. 236.) It is
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submitted that this interpretation of the Bond by the
bonding company's agent who wrote the same removes
any doubt, and that the Bond is only an indemnity for
Johnson upon which the Bennetts have no claim. Accordingly it does not provide the protection required by
the statute and the Johnsons and Clarks, as owners benefitted, are liable.
The appellants in their brief cite and rely upon
DeLuxe Glass Company v. Martin, 116 Ut. 144, 208 Pac.
2nd 1127. The case is not in point and has no application
to the facts here before the court. In DeLuxe Glass Company, the Bond required the principal (contractor) to
"perform and fulfill all the . . . agreements of said contract . . ." The construction contract there specifically
provided that "the contractor shall provide and pay for
all materials, labor, . . . and other facilities necessary"
for completion of the work. This court very properly and
correctly ruled that the provision of the Bond guaranteeing performance of this clause in the construction
contract was in effect a provision for the Benefit of materialmen and laborers as third party beneficiaries, who
could bring their action thereon. However, in the construction contract now before the court there is no provision comparable to the quoted provision in the DeLuxe
Glass Company contract. The managing partner Johnson recognized this when he insisted on personally paying all approved bills.
Inasmuch as the Bond now before the court does
not protect Bennetts, even when the construction conDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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tract is read as a part of the Bond, the Bond is obviously
insufficient and fails to provide the Bennetts the protection required by the statute, and accordingly upon consideration of these insufficiencies in the Bond they were
entitled, as a matter of law to their judgment against
the Johnsons and Clarks as owners of the property benefitted by the Bennetts' materials and labors.
The case now at bar is governed by this court's later
decision in Boise-Payette Lumber Company v. Phoenix
Indemnity Company, 3 Ut. 2nd 150, 280 Pac. 2nd 448.
In that case this court distinguished DeLuxe Glass Company, supra, noting the absence of any provision in the
construction contract by which the contractor agreed to
pay laborers and materialmen, and that the Bond only
provided for indemnification of loss or damages by reason of the failure of the Principal (contractor) "to faithfully perform said contract," ruled that DeLuxe Glass
Company was not applicable and that the Bond neither
directly or indirectly gave protection to the materialmen,
but only to the owner, and that therefore the materialmen had his cause of action under the statute against
the owner. There are no later Utah decisions on the point
in question, and Boise-Payette Lumber Company, supra,
now states the law of the State of Utah to the facts now
before the court.
There is another reason why the Bond in the case
at bar is insufficient to satisfy the statute in question:
It is totally void by reason of the breach of the terms
thereof by the Obligees, the defendants Johnson and
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Clark. This would be true even if the Bennetts, contrary
to the considerations above set out, could be held to be
third party beneficiaries of the bonding company's obligation to the Johnsons and Clarks and entitled to sue
thereon if the Johnsons and Clarks could sue thereon.
It will be recalled that the Bond contained a specific
provision that "the surety shall not be liable under this
Bond . . . unless said Obligees, or either of them, shall
make payments to the Principal {Downard) strictly in
accordance with the terms of said contract as to payment . . ." (Emphasis Supplied.)
The contract and the Bond required Johnson and
Clark as owners to pay the contractor Downard $31,860.00, exclusive of landscaping, blacktop and fill, as the
contract price. However, it will be remembered that
Johnson, in breach of this condition of the Bond admitted and testified under oath that he paid Downard
or his sub-contractors a total of only $29,179.81. (R. 253254.) And it will be remembered that Johnson himself
managed and controlled all payments directly.
This manifestly breached the condition of the Bond
so that the bonding company was released even from
its agreed direct liability to Johnson. Clearly where the
direct Obligee had no claim against the company, one
holding a derivative claim as a possible third party beneficiary, could have no claim.
Accordingly there was no effective Bond to protect
the Bennetts, by reason of Johnson's breach and default,
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and Bennetts are entitled to have their judgment against
the owners affirmed for failure to provide and maintain
an effective Bond to protect the Bennetts as materialmen and laborers.
It is respectfully submitted that the foregoing considerations require that the judgment below be affirmed,
and make it unnecessary to consider other questions
raised by the appellants. However, as in duty bound,
and in an attempt to assist the court, we shall consider
the other points involved.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JOHNSON AND CLARK'S MOTION
TO DISMISS BENNETTS' COMPLAINT.
Under POINT I of the ARGUMENT in appellants'
brief, the appellants contend that the court should have
granted their motion, made at the conclusion of the evidence, for the dismissal of Bennetts' complaint. This
contention, is in turn based upon the unfounded assumption that the facts and evidence show that there was no
contract entered into by the Johnsons and the Clarks
for the construction of the building in question upon the
land admittedly owned by the Johnsons and Clarks. We
shall not burden the court with a repetition of the evidence presented, as hereinbefore set out in our Statement
of Facts, but shall merely recall that the basis AGREEMENT, Defendants' Exhibit 2, between the Johnsons
and the Clarks and Taco Siesta was itself clearly and un-
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disputedly "a contract involving $500 or more for the
cx>nstmction . . . of any building . . . upon land," within
the terms of the statute. And in recognition of the obligation of the owners, Johnson and Clark, it required
that the actual contractor to be selected (with only the
"approval" of the Lessee), to be "duly bonded." Further,
Johnson demanded and received from Downard a Bond
to indemnify him. The trouble was, that the Bond was
in substance an indemnity bond for Johnsons and Clarks,
and not a payment bond for laborers and materialmen,
and it was invalidated by Johnson's breach thereof in
refusing to pay Downard the full amount of the contract
price, as required by the terms thereof.
Furthermore, the actual construction contract with
Downard was in the name of Johnson, the managing
partner for the Johnsons and Clarks, a role which he,
with notice of that fact in the Bond, proceeded to accept
and exploit by controlling all of the payments made out
of the funds provided by Johnsons and Clarks, as contracting owners, for the ramstnKJtion of the building on
their land. And the jury, after hearing all of the evidence
and the arguments of counsel, found that it was proven
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant,
Johnson, was a party to the construction contract with
Downard, Defendants' Exhibit 1. Clearly there is some
evidence to support the jury's verdict, which is therefore
conclusive. We respectfully submit that the trial court
committed no error in denying the motion of defendants
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Johnson and Clark for dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING JOHNSON AND CLARK'S MOTION
TO DISMISS DEFENDANT DOWNARD'S
CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THEM.
In responding to this issue raised by "POINT II"
of the appellants' brief, the Bennetts should observe that
they are only indirectly interested in Mr. Downard's
judgment against the Johnsons and the Clarks for the
balance due on his construction contract. They do not
have an interest, as they have a judgment against Downard, but it would appear that Downard can pay Bennetts
only if the Johnsons and Clarks pay him what what they
owe. However Bennetts wish only to be paid once for
their materials and labor.
No doubt Mr. Downard's counsel will argue this
matter more fully, but Bennetts are content to submit
this matter upon the evidence hereinbefore summarized,
and upon the special verdict of the jury to the effect
that Johnson was a party to and bound by the construction contract made in his name by the architect and
accepted and confirmed by him in his name by the architect and accepted and confirmed by him by his subsequent actions. Perhaps it might be helpful to the court
to add that even if the contract had been executed between Taco Siesta and Downard, the Johnsons and
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Clarks would be bound thereby because, as heretofore
indicated, the formation of the contract, if made by
Taco Siesta, would have been in furtherance of a joint
enterprise, and Taco Siesta was, under the basic agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2, the effective agent of the
Johnson and the Clarks for the purpose of effecting a
a construction contract lor the improvement of their
land so that it could be leased to Taco Siesta.
There was no error in the trial court's denial of appellants' motion to dismiss Downard's cross-claim against
the Johnsons and Clarks.
POINT V.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN
GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 2.
Under POINT III of their brief the appellants Johnson and Clark take exception to the court's submitting
to the jury interrogatory number 2, with the related explanation, inquiring whether it was proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant Johnson was
a party to the construction contract Defendants' Exhibit
1. Appellants contend that there was no evidence whatsoever in the record to justify the submission of this
issue to the jury for decision. Apparently not only the
court, but the jury disagree with appellants' position,
for the jury unanimously returned its special verdict
to the effect that it was proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that Johnson was a party to the construction contract.
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This contention of appellants is a clear sample of
"wishful thinking," for the record of the testimony and
the exhibits are replete with evidence supporting the
conclusion that Johnson, as managing partner of appellants' partnership, was a party to the construction contract.
First, the basic agreement, Defendants' Exhibit 2,
providing for the construction of the building to improve
appellants' land at their expense, clearly establishes a
joint enterprise for such cx)nstruction, in which each party would be the agent of the other for the purpose of
accomplishing the project,, and also the agency of Taco
Siesta for the owner in obtaining a contractor to accomplish this basic purpose. The evidence clearly establishes
that the architect, Wilkins, was retained as the acting
representative of the parties to the joint enterprise. Although Downard admitted that he quoted a construction
contract price, in the first instance, to a Taco Siesta
representative, he further testified that in this case, as
in other cases in which he had built restaurants for owners leasing to T&co Siesta, his dealing with respect to
the actual contract and the performance thereof were
entirely with the property owners. The architect Wilkins
prepared a printed form of construction contract in the
name of appellant Johnson, the managing partner, and
pursuant to the authority contained in the basic agreement, signed the same for Johnson. Johnson himself
admitted, under oath, that he, as owners' representative,
personally demanded of Downard that he be furnished
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with a contractor's surety bond, and that pursuant to
this demand the Bond was mailed to him sometime in
August, shortly alter the amstruction contract was signed
and the job began. This, bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B,
specifically names Claris E. Johnson as the Obligee and
recites that the Principal Downard has executed and
entered into a certain contract "with said Obligee" for
the construction of the restaurant. Johnson, apparently
an experienced businessman, never took any exception
to this recital in the Bond, but instead of turning over
the agreed amount of money to Taco Siesta, proceeded
personally to make all progress payments to Downard
and the sub-contractors and materialmen out of the funds
furnished by the appellants Johnson and Clark. The uncontradicted testimony of both Downard and Johnson
is to the effect that Johnson never told Downard that
he should deal with Taco Siesta rather than with Johnson as the contracting owner, but personally paid to
Downard and/or the sub-contractors all of the sums of
money due under the construction contract, and controlled the same, paying on every occasion with checks
either personally signed by Johnson as maker, or made
by the lending bank to Johnson and Clark and endorsed
by them and delivered to Downard or the sub-contractors.
So far as the appellants' contention that there is no
evidence that Johnson knew that the contract had been
executed by Wilkins for Johnson, the statement made
in the brief is just completely unjustified in view of the
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record, and particularly in view of the fact that the contractor's Bond, Exhibit B, received by Johnson, recites
that Johnson is a party to the contract. Johnson is clearly charged, as a matter of law, with notice of the contents of the Bond demanded by and furnished to him.
He had the means and the opportunity in his hands to
establish this fact, and Bennetts were certainly not
charged with any notice to the contrary.
It is the established and unvarying rule of this
Honorable Court, under the Constitution of Utah relating to jury trials, that the reviewing Appellate Court
will not disturb a jury verdict so long as there is any
evidence from which, together with fair inferences that
may be drawn therefrom, reasonable minds could conclude as the jury did. See
Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Ut. 2nd 287, 391 Pac.
2nd 430;
Brunson v. Strong, 17 Ut. 2nd 364, 412 Pac. 2nd
451; and
In Re Estate of Hubbard, 30 Ut. 2nd 260, 516
Pac. 2nd 741.
POINT VI.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR BY
ADVISING THE JURY OF THE NATURE
OF THE BOND, PLAINTIFFS' EXHIBIT B,
AND COMMENTING THAT THE BONDING COMPANY "INSOFAR AS THE COURT
IS AWARE" WILL STAND ANY LOSS MR.
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JOHNSON TAKES "MERELY BECAUSE
HE IS A LANDOWNER." THE CLAIMED
ERROR, IF ANY, IS HARMLESS.
The Surety Bond, Plaintiffs' Exhibit B, was stipulated to be the original of the Bond furnished by Mr.
Downard in connection with the job, as the Bond was
furnished to the Johnsons and the Clarks, and was received in evidence on that stipulation. (R. 245.) The
one provision of the Bond which was specifically read to
the jury and emphasized was the last paragraph on Page
1 containing the proviso that in no event shall the surety
company be subject to any suit action or other proceeding thereto that is instituted later than 1 year after date
of completion, which was March 11. (R. 246.) The Bond
was in the jury's possession and available for review
during the jury's deliberations. The record shows that
after the court made its comment on the Bond and counsel for appellants objected, the court then gave the following further instruction to the jury relating to the
matter:
You must understand that the question that
is going to be put to you regarding — so that
parties understand it before they rest completely on the evidence, — the issue will be between
the plaintiff and the defendants and Johnson
insofar as direct recovery of Bennetts against
Johnson will depend upon whether or not Bennetts had reasonable access when asked for the
Bond. If they had reasonable access to the Bond
then they cannot go against Johnson as far as
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this situation is concerned, but if they did, if
Johnson did not make the Bond reasonably
available to them . . . then he is not protected
by the statute and then he is liable. (R. 302303.) (Emphasis Supplied.)
Then, the case was not submitted for a general verdict, but was submitted on a special interrogatory as to
whether or not is was proven that Bennetts made demand on Johnson to exhibit the Bond and that they did
not reasonably comply.
In the light of the court's immediate comment upon
the true nature of the issue of fact, and in view of the
nature of the special interrogatory submitted to the jury
for its verdict, it cannot be presumed, or assumed, that
the jury's special verdict was compelled or influenced
by the fact that the judge said that "so far as he is
aware" Johnson might have recourse against the bonding company for any loss sustained because he was a
landowner. The court's supplementary comment and instruction made it abundantly clear that the jury was
concerned only with the evidence as to the demand for
access to the Bond and the response thereto.
Furthermore, the provision in the Bond limiting time
for maintaining an action thereon was specifically called
to the jury's attention and read to the jury when the
Bond was introduced, and was again called the jury's
attention by the nature of the objection made by appellants' counsel that "because of the passage of time
the bonding company may say its not responsible and
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that Mr. Johnson would have to file and pass along such
claims within a certain time," and this was followed immediately by the court's further instruction that the jury
would be concerned only with the determination, on the
evidence, of whether or not the Bennetts had reasonable
access when they asked for the Bond. (R. 302.)
Finally the court in its formal instructions carefully
and correctly instructed the jury as to the issue to be
decided with respect to the demand for and failure to
exhibit the Bond, that the burden thereof was on the
plaintiffs to prove the demond and the failure, and the
customary instructions tihat the case must be decided
solely upon the evidence received. The court further
gave the standard instriiction to the effect that if the
court had done anything which suggested that it is inclined to favor the claim or position of either party the
jury would not permit itself to be influenced by any
such suggestion. (Court's Instruction, R. 151, 152, 155,
158 and 159.)
And finally, it is respectfully submitted that it is
clear under all of the circumstances that even if it should
be considered that the court, in making the comment on
the Bond complained of, committed a technical error*
it was harmless end could not affect the ultimate, proper
outcome of the trial in favor of the plaintiffs Bennett.
First, it should be noted that Johnson at all material
times had possession of the Bond and is charged with
notice of its contents. From his own testimony it is
apparent that he knew, long before the 1 year special
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limitation elapsed, that Bennetts were asserting and pursuing a claim against him personally. If he failed to present his claim, it was due to his own neglect and failure
to attend to his business as a reasonable, prudent business man. He cannot justly, equitably, or legally gain
any advantage from his own neglect and default, as suggested by the argument of appellants' counsel. And as
a party to the Bond he cannot be heard to deny knowledge of its contents. Indeed, in fairness to him and his
counsel, it cannot be said that they do claim ignorance
of the provisions of the Bond.
Lastly, and even more important, as hereinabove
demonstrated under Points I and II of this brief, Bennetts were entitled to judgment against the Johnsons
and the Olarks because the Bond furnished was legally
insufficient as a matter of law, irrespective of whether
or not demand for the exhibit of the Bond had been made
and refused. In view of the form of the Bond and the
conduct of the defendant Johnson, which is undisputed,
the Bond was insufficient under the statute, so that issue
settled by the jury becomes irrelevant, immaterial and
unnecessary to the proper decision of the case in favor
of the Bennetts.
For these reasons, the court's error in discussing the
Bond with the jury, if any, was immaterial and harmless,
and need not, and should not be considered in connection
with the proper disposition of this appeal under the undisputed facts and the law. There is no reasonable likelihood that injustice has, in the end, resulted. In this
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connection, see Lamb v. Bangart, Ut*, 525 Pac. 2nd 602,
Haadmote 14
The lower court's comments do not constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given, it is respectfully submitted
that the judgment of the court below in favor of the
Bennetts and against the appellants Johnson and Clark
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

PAUL THATCHER
of YOUNG, THATCHER
& GLASMANN
and
JOSEPH S. NELSON
Attorneys for PlaintiffsRespondents Bennett
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